Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection(English, Paperback, Samuelson Larry)

Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection(English, Paperback, Samuelson Larry)

  • Samuelson Larry
Publisher:MIT PressISBN 13: 9780262692199ISBN 10: 0262692198

Paperback & Hardcover deals ―

Amazon IndiaGOFlipkart ₹ 4603SnapdealGOSapnaOnlineGOJain Book AgencyGOBooks Wagon₹377Book ChorGOCrosswordGODC BooksGO

e-book & Audiobook deals ―

Amazon India GOGoogle Play Books GOAudible GO

* Price may vary from time to time.

* GO = We're not able to fetch the price (please check manually visiting the website).

Know about the book -

Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection(English, Paperback, Samuelson Larry) is written by Samuelson Larry and published by MIT Press Ltd. It's available with International Standard Book Number or ISBN identification 0262692198 (ISBN 10) and 9780262692199 (ISBN 13).

The author examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. Evolutionary game theory is one of the most active and rapidly growing areas of research in economics. Unlike traditional game theory models, which assume that all players are fully rational and have complete knowledge of details of the game, evolutionary models assume that people choose their strategies through a trial-and-error learning process in which they gradually discover that some strategies work better than others. In games that are repeated many times, low-payoff strategies tend to be weeded out, and an equilibrium may emerge. Larry Samuelson has been one of the main contributors to the evolutionary game theory literature. In Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection, he examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. After providing an overview of the basic issues of game theory and a presentation of the basic models, the book addresses evolutionary stability, the dynamics of sample paths, the ultimatum game, drift, noise, backward and forward induction, and strict Nash equilibria.