Success and Failure in Limited War

Success and Failure in Limited War

  • Spencer D. Bakich
Publisher:University of Chicago PressISBN 13: 9780226107851ISBN 10: 022610785X

Paperback & Hardcover deals ―

Amazon IndiaGOFlipkart GOSnapdealGOSapnaOnlineGOJain Book AgencyGOBooks Wagon₹4,294Book ChorGOCrosswordGODC BooksGO

e-book & Audiobook deals ―

Amazon India GOGoogle Play Books ₹0.5Audible GO

* Price may vary from time to time.

* GO = We're not able to fetch the price (please check manually visiting the website).

Know about the book -

Success and Failure in Limited War is written by Spencer D. Bakich and published by University of Chicago Press. It's available with International Standard Book Number or ISBN identification 022610785X (ISBN 10) and 9780226107851 (ISBN 13).

Common and destructive, limited wars are significant international events that pose a number of challenges to the states involved beyond simple victory or defeat. Chief among these challenges is the risk of escalation—be it in the scale, scope, cost, or duration of the conflict. In this book, Spencer D. Bakich investigates a crucial and heretofore ignored factor in determining the nature and direction of limited war: information institutions. Traditional assessments of wartime strategy focus on the relationship between the military and civilians, but Bakich argues that we must take into account the information flow patterns among top policy makers and all national security organizations. By examining the fate of American military and diplomatic strategy in four limited wars, Bakich demonstrates how not only the availability and quality of information, but also the ways in which information is gathered, managed, analyzed, and used, shape a state's ability to wield power effectively in dynamic and complex international systems. Utilizing a range of primary and secondary source materials, Success and Failure in Limited War makes a timely case for the power of information in war, with crucial implications for international relations theory and statecraft.