Banking Crisis

Banking Crisis

  • Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons. Treasury Committee
Publisher:The Stationery OfficeISBN 13: 9780215530271ISBN 10: 0215530276

Paperback & Hardcover deals ―

Amazon IndiaGOFlipkart GOSnapdealGOSapnaOnlineGOJain Book AgencyGOBooks Wagon₹967Book ChorGOCrosswordGODC BooksGO

e-book & Audiobook deals ―

Amazon India GOGoogle Play Books GOAudible GO

* Price may vary from time to time.

* GO = We're not able to fetch the price (please check manually visiting the website).

Know about the book -

Banking Crisis is written by Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons. Treasury Committee and published by The Stationery Office. It's available with International Standard Book Number or ISBN identification 0215530276 (ISBN 10) and 9780215530271 (ISBN 13).

This report examines remuneration in the City of London, as well as the nexus of private actors, including non-executive directors, institutional shareholders, auditors and credit rating agencies, who failed to act as a check on, and balance to, senior managers and the executive boards of banks. The report concludes that the banking crisis has exposed serious flaws and shortcomings in remuneration practices in the banking sector and, in particular, within investment banking. The Committee is concerned that the FSA's Turner Review downplays the role that remuneration played in causing the banking crisis and questions whether the regulator is attaching sufficient priority to tackling the issue. The Committee notes the culture in the City of London, which encouraged excessive risk taking. Lord Myners' assertion that his precept to the RBS Board - that there should be no reward for failure - did not represent an adequate oversight of the remuneration of outgoing senior bank staff, and the report casts doubt on the Treasury's decision to rely on the then RBS Board to handle negotiations with these staff without direct Treasury involvement. The financial crisis has exposed serious flaws and shortcomings in the system of non-executive oversight of bank executives. Three problems are noted: the lack of time many non-executives commit to their role, with many combining a senior full-time position with multiple non-executive directorships; in many instances a lack of expertise; and a lack of diversity. The failure of institutional investors effectively to scrutinise and monitor the decision of boards and executive management in the banking sector may reflect the low priority some institutional investors have accorded to governance issues; in some cases, they may have even encouraged the risk-taking that proved the downfall of some banks.