Fixing LIBOR

Know about the book -

Fixing LIBOR is written by Great Britain: Parliament: House of Commons: Treasury Committee and published by The Stationery Office. It's available with International Standard Book Number or ISBN identification 0215047664 (ISBN 10) and 9780215047663 (ISBN 13).

This report follows the Committee's inquiry into the Final Notice issued by the Financial Services Authority with respect to Barclays on 27 June, 2012. The Committee has called for action in a number of areas, including: higher fines for firms that fail to co-operate with regulators, the need to examine gaps in the criminal law, and a much stronger governance framework at the Bank of England. The manipulations were made possible by a prolonged period of extremely weak internal compliance and board governance at Barclays, as well as a failure of regulatory supervision. Nor was it spotted either by the FSA or the Bank of England at the time. The evidence that Mr Tucker, Mr Diamond and Mr del Missier separately gave about this manipulation describes a combination of circumstances which would excuse all the participants from the charge of deliberate wrongdoing. If they are all to be believed, an extraordinary, but conceivably plausible, series of miscommunications occurred. It is also unlikely that Barclays was the only bank attempting the manipulations.In explaining what was wrong with the general culture at Barclays, the FSA showed some welcome evidence of a new, judgement-led regulatory approach. Regulators should not decide the composition of boards in response to headlines and many will wonder why they did not intervene earlier to remove Mr Diamond. The Bank of England should have had adequate procedures in place for at least the making of a File note of conversations such as that between Mr Tucker and Mr Diamond. The Wheatley review should now look at the role of the BBA in LIBOR setting at that time in detail and publish its findings. The Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards' examination of the corporate governance of systemically important financial institutions should consider how to mitigate the risk that the leadership style of a chief executive may permit a lack of effective challenge or to the firm committing strategic mistakes