Emotional Choices

Emotional Choices

  • Robin Markwica
Publisher:Oxford University PressISBN 13: 9780192513113ISBN 10: 0192513117

Paperback & Hardcover deals ―

Amazon IndiaGOFlipkart GOSnapdealGOSapnaOnlineGOJain Book AgencyGOBooks Wagon₹7,544Book ChorGOCrosswordGODC BooksGO

e-book & Audiobook deals ―

Amazon India GOGoogle Play Books ₹83.99Audible GO

* Price may vary from time to time.

* GO = We're not able to fetch the price (please check manually visiting the website).

Know about the book -

Emotional Choices is written by Robin Markwica and published by Oxford University Press. It's available with International Standard Book Number or ISBN identification 0192513117 (ISBN 10) and 9780192513113 (ISBN 13).

Why do states often refuse to yield to military threats from a more powerful actor, such as the United States? Why do they frequently prefer war to compliance? International Relations scholars generally employ the rational choice logic of consequences or the constructivist logic of appropriateness to explain this puzzling behavior. Max Weber, however, suggested a third logic of choice in his magnum opus Economy and Society: human decision making can also be motivated by emotions. Drawing on Weber and more recent scholarship in sociology and psychology, Robin Markwica introduces the logic of affect, or emotional choice theory, into the field of International Relations. The logic of affect posits that actors' behavior is shaped by the dynamic interplay among their norms, identities, and five key emotions: fear, anger, hope, pride, and humiliation. Markwica puts forward a series of propositions that specify the affective conditions under which leaders are likely to accept or reject a coercer's demands. To infer emotions and to examine their influence on decision making, he develops a methodological strategy combining sentiment analysis and an interpretive form of process tracing. He then applies the logic of affect to Nikita Khrushchev's behavior during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and Saddam Hussein's decision making in the Gulf conflict in 1990-1 offering a novel explanation for why U.S. coercive diplomacy succeeded in one case but not in the other.